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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: IAS PART 39

------------------------------------------x

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF
MICHAEL QUARTARARO,
Petitioner,

Index No. 45734/92

)

For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules,
- against THE NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF
PAROLE, RAUL RUSSI, Chairman,
Respondent.

------------------------------------------x
KRISTIN BOOTH GLEN, J .·:

On February 11,

1992 petitioner was denied parole after a

hearing which he subsequently challenged in this court by way of _an
Article 78 proceeding.

In a decision dated January 31,

1994, I

granted his petition and remanded to the Parole Board for a de novo
consideration, finding that:
... the
Board misconstrued
its
role
and
prejudged
this
parole
application
and
therefore its determination to deny parole
must be set aside and a de novo hearing held.
In addition to the "misconstruing of its role" which was the
basis for the reversal, I also considered several issues raised by
petitioner concerning materials allegedly improperly considered by
the Board.

I

carefully reviewed and wrote about each of the

claimed errors "in order to avoid their repetition at the de novo

t.

(

hearing."
I

specifically held that the Board could not consider the

confession of Peter Quartararo, petitioner's brother, which had
been found unconstitutionally and illegally obtained, Quartararo v
Montello, 715 F. Supp. 449 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) aff'd

888 F 2d 126 (2:nld

Cir. 1989) . 1 A subsequent decision of our Court of Appeals, People
v

Brenesic,

confession

70

NY2d

was

not

910
only

(1987)

found

that Peter Quartararo's

unconstitutionally

obtained

but

also

unreliable as a matter of law. 2
In addition to the confession itself, I also considered that
the Parole Board had relied upon the fact of petiti~ner's first
conviction.

Since

this

conviction

had

been

overturned

on

constitutional grounds because of the ineffective assistance of
counsel, I held:

1

The District Court took note of the fact that the
Temporary Commission of Investigation of the State of New York, in
its investigation of the practices of the Suffolk County District
Attorney's Office and Police Department found that the Suffolk
County police deliberately violated the United States Constitution
and New York laws and that their behavior was "characteristic of
conduct long tolerated by responsible officials of the Suffolk
County Police Department and the District Attorney's Office."
715 F. Supp. at 456. See also, Report of the Temporary Commission
on Investigation of the State of New York, dated April, 1989.
2

This was an appeal by one of the co-defendants, who was
tried separately from the petitioner and Peter.
The other codefendant, Thomas Ryan also had his conviction reversed based on
the illegally obtained and unreliable confession of Peter
Quartararo. People v Ryan, 134 AD2d 300 (2nd Dept. 1987).
2
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The contents of an unreliable confession .and
the outcome of a trial so defective that the
conviction
was
reversed
on
ineffective
assistance of counsel grounds, have no place
in a Parole Board hearing and determination.
Third, I noticed that there was some evidence that the Parole
Board members impropeir-ly relied upon press accounts in their review
of petitioner's application.

This was a

notorious

crime,

and

continues to arouse strong feelings, even so many years after its
occurrence.

In accordance with such cases as People ex rel Howlind

v Henderson, 54 AD2d 614 (4th Dept. 1976) and Brennan v Cunningham,
813 F. 2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) I specifically held that:
The Parole Board shall not weigh or even
mention press reports or their contents in a
hearing de novo or in any future hearings.
I next considered.petitioner's allegations that the Board had
improperly considered the revocation of his participation in work
release.

In an in camera examination of the parole file I found

documents relating to investigation of allegations made against
petitioner which resulted in the revocation, although petitioner
was never given an opportunity to rebut the allegations,

or any

other due process in relation to the Department of Correctional
Services' revocation.

Nevertheless it seemed clear that the board

had relied upon these completely unchallenged ex parte allegations.
Accordingly, I ordered that:
all documentation concerning the work
release revocation investigation be removed
3

{

from the parole file, unless in the interim,
petitioner has had notice of the basis for the
revocation, and the opportunity for a hearing
or review of the determination in accordance
with Correction Law §150 et. seq. and 7 NYCRR
§1904.
Finally,

I

considered the inclusion of photo~raphs of the

victim which were apparently furnished to the Parole Board by the
District Attorney of Suffolk County, allegedly in an attempt to
inflame the Parole Board against the petitioner. 3

I ordered that

the photographs be removed from the parole file and returned to the
District Attorney or Supreme Court, Suffolk County, whichever was
appropriate.

The respondent did not appeal my decision, and on

February 23, 1994, the de novo parole hearing which I had ordered
was held.
The February 1994 Hearing

Although denominated a de novo hearing, no new Inmate status
Report,

required for parole hearings, was prepared or utilized.

Instead, the contents of the Report which had been prepared for the
February 1992 hearing was employed.

The only changes were the

typeface and the date at the top of the Report, but in all other
respects the two Reports were identical.
other respects,

Unfortunately, in many

the February 1994 hearing was a replay of that

3

The inflammatory and gratuitous use of these pictures at
trial had already been commented upon by a federal court in
overturning petitioner's conviction. Quartararo v Fogg, supra, 679
F. Supp. at 243.
4

,.·
'
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which I had already found improper.

This hearing was conducted by

Parole Commissioners Treen and Tauriello.
Despite my order that Peter Quartararo's confession not be
considered, it is clear from a number of facts that the confession
was prominent in the minds of the two Parole Commissioners.
example,

petitioner

observed

stated

Commissioner

For

in an unrebutted affidavit that .he

Treen

reading

the

1992

transcript,

a

transcript which, as already noted, contained substantial reference
to Peter Quartararo's confession.

Commissioner Treen's affidavit

here does not deny that she reviewed the 1992 transcript.
she

claims

Quartararo's

that

she

was

suppressed

instructed
confession

conviction which was reversed...
documents
Having

concerning

been

a

"not
and

to

Instead,

consider

petitioner's

Peter
first

press reports of the crime or

work release revocation investigation."

specifically

told

inflammatory,

prejudicial,

and

improper i terns upon which the question of parole could not be
~e_t:erm_~_n~d, it strci~I1_S _c::~eduli_ty_ 'to belie~e that thesE: matters_ were
not in some way in the mind of Commissioner Treen during the de
novo hearing.
More to the point, however, the file contained letters from
the Suffolk County District Attorney's which specifically discussed
and relied upon Peter Quartararo's confession.
Patterson wrote:
5

District Attorney

f

I

Peter Quartararo confessed to police and his
own mother that he and three other youths had
killed John Pius. Peter Quartararo's detailed
confession was fully corroborated by evidence
found at the crime scene and information
received from independent sources.
(emphasis added)
Patterson

went

conviction,

on

to

comment

on

'

the

reversal

of

the

1981

stating that it was "not based on any question of

[petitioner's] guilt," thus demonstrating his unfamiliarity with
the requirements of Strickland v Washington,
(1984)

466 U.S.

668,

694

and Judge Korman's comments about the weakness of the case.

The file also contains a letter from an Assistant District Attorney
Jones which similarly refers to the suppressed confession and
asserts,

erroneously,

that

it was fully corroborated by other

evidence.
In addition, the file, like all others, contains the minutes
of petitioner's sentence, see Pen. L. §380.70, see also Exec. L.
§259-a.

At sentencing the District Attorney, over objection, read

extensively from Peter Quartararo's confession.

It is clear that

references to this suppressed confession appear in at least two
places,

and excerpts from it appear on a third.

extensive references

to,

confession,

references

nor

the

and

Neither these

excerpts from Peter Quartararo' s
in

the

two

Assistant

District

Attorney's letters were redacted from the parole file which was
submitted to Commissioners Treen and Tauriello as was required by
-

6
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my decision and order.
The transcript of the February hearing indicates that much of
what occurred was an attempt to have petitioner confess to the
crime, which he refused to do,

i

based on assertion of his Fifth

Amendment privilege4 although he repeatedly expressed sorrow over
the death of John Pius, and sympathy with the loss suffered by his
parents.

The Board denied parole based on what it characterized as

his lack of remorse, with his assertions of innocence characterized
as "intellectualism of the crime."
of

remorse

and

The Board found that such lack
was

"intellectualism"

"an

impression

of

insensitivity on [petitioner's] part, and as such we maintain a
belief that [his] release at this opportunity is not in the best
interest of the welfare of the community."
Because of the delay caused by the various levels of appeal
from

the

scheduled

first

parole

parole

hearing

hearing,
occurred

petitioner's
a

month

next

after

the

regularly
de

novo

hearing, on March 23, 1994.

4

At the time of the hearing, a challenge to petitioner's
conviction by way of federal habeas corpus was pending.
One of
petitioner's arguments in this proceeding is that this questioning
and the "punishment" which he alleges flowed from his assertion of
the privilege violated his constitutional rights, and requires
reversal of the Parole Board's determinations.
Because I have
decided this proceeding in his favor on other grounds, it is
neither necessary nor appropriate to reach the constitutional
issue.
7

The March Hearing

This time the hearing was before Commissioners George King and
Julian Rhodes.
information

of

As at the February hearing, the letters containing
Peter

Quartararo' s

confession,

as

well

as

the

sentencing minutes were in the file presented to and considered by
those Commissioners.

Once again, there is extraneous evidence that

the confessions were considered during the course of this hearing.
The minutes contain

an undeniable reference to the suppressed

confession, where Commissioner King asks:
Do you know of any reason that the codefendants would have to implicate you in
(John Pius's J death?
Do you have any bad
blood
was there bad blood or some
disagreement
between
you
and
the
codefendant's that requires them to implicate
you in this crime?
(emphasis added)
Once again petitioner expressed deep sorrow for the death of John
Pius stating:
That was a horrible kind of tragic thing that
happened, and I'm sorry that it happened ...
but refused to discuss his "guilt."

Parole was again denied, this

time the basis set forth by the Board was the seriousness of the
crime and its belief that his refusal to admit to the crime despite
counseling meant that he had gained no insight into the behavior
which resulted in his conviction.

It wrote:

Further
extensive
confinement
within
a
structured setting is required to safeguard
8

(

community protection while you participate in
extensive counseling to erode the massive wall
you've placed between your emotions and your
criminal behavior.
Violations of the January 1993 Order

As is clear from this brief recitation of the facts of the de

'

novo and March parole hearings, the Board continued to consider
and,

in the case of the confession,

may well have relied upon

material which I specifically ordered removed from the files.

This

includes not only references to the suppressed confession already
discussed, but also documents pertaining to the work release issue,
and "public pressure."
As to work release documents, despite an initial denial here,
the State has now conceded that the file contains the following
documents relating to the petitioner's participation in the work
release program.
Application and Denial for Program for April
1991; Application and Denial of Application
9/91;
Queensborough
TRP
Memorandum
of
Agreement 1/17/92,
Furlough papers dated
1/24/92, and E-Mail referencing a 2/12/92
review to the Temporary Release Committee
(TRC) at Queensborough Correctional Facility
from Senior Counselor Lester advising of
petitioner's removal from work release program
due to the two-year hold imposed by the
February 1992 Board of Parole decision ( in
accord with statutory requirements) 5
5

Despite an earlier claim that the law required work
release to be revoked upon denial of parole, it is now conceded
(continued ... )
9

(

My order required that no information about removal from work
release be contained in the file unless and until petitioner was
given notice and a hearing or similar due process.

The state

initially claimed that petitioner had been given such notice by
virtue of a FeBruary 27, 1992 memo from the Director of Temporary
Release Programs which simply affirmed the revocation.

The second

document which the State claims provided notice was a June 15, 1993
letter to the petitioner from Department of Correctional Services
Deputy Commissioner Coombe, indicating that removal from the work
release program occurred because petitioner was denied parole.

As

alre~dy noted, this is an incorrect statement of the law.
In addition,
petitioner,

this document,

the only one received by the

(except by virtue of submission of the first document

to court and,

therefore presumably made available to petitioner

through his attorneys)

is dated almost a year and a half after

petitioner's work release was revoked and affirmed.

5

This can

( ••• continued)
that removal from the work release program is not automatic due to
a two year parole hold. In Volpis v Department of Correction, 154
Misc 2d 625 (Sup. ct. Kings Co. 1992) the court interpreted NYCL
§851, holding that when an inmate currently participating in a
temporary release program is denied parole the inmate cannot
automatically become ineligible for temporary release because of
the parole denial.
Rather, the Department is required to review
the inmate's status to determine if continued participation is
appropriate.
The court additionally noted that the statute
indicates that the concept of "Temporary Release Program" is
separate and unrelated to parole denial.

10

I

hardly be considered notice, nor, in any way, satisfy even minimal
The inclusion of such documents

requirements of due process.

therefore also clearly violates my order.
Finally, petitioner claims that the February de novo hearing
was affected by public pressure in the form~ letters from the
public.

Despite denial by the respondent in its Verified Answer,

the hearing transcript reveals that the Commissioners were familiar
with these letters. 6

Thus, although no specific press accounts

have been found in the file,

it appears that letters other than

those specifically permitted under the statute,

reflecting the

public pressure against which my pri?r opinion warned, were before
the Board and considered by them.
It is clear that not once, but twice after my decision and
order,

the

Board

irnperrnissibly

considered

a

number

of

highly

prejudicial and unlawful i terns in denying petitioner parole in
February and March of 1994.

6

This impermissible consideration and

Commissioner Treen stated:
... obviously this is a very heavy folder.
There are letters in here from people who have
come in contact with you both from the
community for employment and corrections,
people I guess you and/ or your family have
reached out to.
And of course there are
letters talking about other aspects of Michael
Quartararo, with the victim impact letters and
so forth.
(emphasis added)
11

violation of the prior order would clearly call for relief, but the
respondent has interposed a number of technical and procedural
objections which must

be

dealt with before proceeding to the

merits.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES

'\

In June 1994, petitioner, appearing prose brought a motion to
hold the respondents

in contempt for their alleged failure to

comply with my January 1994 order.

In the alternative, petitioner

moved for an order granting release on parole.

Respondent opposed

the contempt motion on several grounds, including lack of personal
jurisdiction.

In

an

order

dated August

30,

1994,

I

respondent's motion to dismiss the contempt proceeding.
to CPLR 103,

I

granted
Pursuant

converted the motion to an Article 78 petition

challenging the parole determination made after the February 1994
de novo hearing.
In its answer to the motion,

and to the newly denominated

Article 78 petition, respondent mentioned, in passing, that venue
was

improper,

addition,

but made no motion for a

respondent

originally

change of venue.

challenged

the

Article

In
78

proceeding as moot, because of the new hearing held in March of
1994. 7

At the time of conversion to the Article 78 proceeding,

7

Because the generally appropriate disposition in an
Article 78 challenge to parole hearing is rehearing, see, e.g.,
(continued ... )
12

the

Parole

Board's March determination was

not

final,

so the

conversion order could not include an Article 78 challenge to that
decision.
for

However by March 20, 1995, all administrative remedies

the :March parole

denial were

exhausted.

Petitioner,

now

represented by a clinic at Fordha)n Law School, moved to have an
Article 78 challenge to the March 1994 hearing consolidated in this
proceeding.

That motion was granted without objection, but with

respondent reserving its exception to venue, discussed infra.
Any question of exhaustion of administrative remedies is no
longer

in

this

case.

The

only

possible

impediment

to

my

consideration of the Board's actions in both the February and March
1994 hearings is respondent's belated claim that there is no venue
New York County.

It is to this cla.im which we must next, albeit

briefly, turn.
Respondent argues that this proceeding can only be heard in
Albany County and that it ·has been improperly venued in New York
County.

Respondent relies upon CPLR §78.04(b} which refers to the

7

( • • • continued}
Matter of Morgan v Board, 198 AD2d 836 (4th Dept. 1993} Matter of
Kenny v Division, 198 AD2d 423, 435, (1st Dept. 1993} a successful
resolution of the petition would simply require a new hearing.
Since he received an additional release hearing in March, the
respondent argued that any challenge to his February hearing was
moot, because the result of the February hearing was no longer that
which held petitioner in the 'correctional system. See, Matter of
James v Lussi,
AD2d
621 NYS 2d 894 (2nd Dept. 1995}.

13
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venue provisions of CPLR §506 (b).

The latter provides that when an

action is brought against a body or officer it must be venued as
follows:
A proceeding against a body or officer shall
be commenced in any county within the judicial
district where the
respondent made
the
determination complained of... or where the
material events otherwise took place, or where
the principal office of the respondent is
located ...
The

decision

complained

of

Facility in Ulster County,

occurred

at

Walkill

Correctional

the final determination occurred in

Albany County where the Parole Board's principal office is located
and Albany County is also an appropriate venue under the "principal
office" provision of the statute.
This, however, does not end the inquiry.
CPLR

contains

challenged.

procedures

by

which

improper

Article 5 of the
venue

must

be

Rule 511 provides for the service of a demand for

change of venue on the ground that the county designated is not a
proper county, CPLR §5ll(a).

That demand must be served with the

answer, or prior to service of the answer.

If the party who has

improperly venued the action or proceeding does not respond within
five days after such service, the party seeking change of venue
must move for change of venue within 15 days of service of the
demand.
mandatory.

Compliance with this

demand and motion procedure

See, e.g., State v Whitney,
14

is

66 AD2d 1029 (4th Dept.

/

\

1978). 8
If a timely statutory demand for change of venue pursuant to
CPLR §511(a) is not made, the party seeking a change of venue is
" ... foreclosed from obtaining a change of venue pursuant to CPLR
§504

and

the

issue us

committed

Losicco v Gardner's Village Inc.,
1983).

the

court's

97 AD2d 535,

discretion."

536

(2nd Dept.

Cf. Morales v City of New York, 189 AD2d 581 (1st Dept.
(because

1993)

to

motion

was

timely

made,

although

undecided,

subsequent discretionary motion can be decided in favor of change
of venue.)
In the instant case, no statutory demand was ever made.

The

petitioner's motion to hold respondent in contempt was converted to
an Article 78 proceeding by Order dated August 30th,
October 12, 1994, respondent filed a Verified Answer.
the February,

1994 hearing,

1994.

On

Referring to

the answer states that petition is

improperly venued in New York County, but makes no demand for a
change of venue. 9

Nor, to this date, has any motion for change of

8

The Appellate Division, First Department, like the other
departments, has "declined to construe [the] statutory time
requirement [or demand a change of venue based on the designation
of an improper county] as merely discretionary." Pittman v Maher,
202 AD2d 172, {1st Dept. 1994).
9

The venue issue was "mentioned" once before. In its June
23, 1994 Notice of Cross Motion to Dismiss, the Affidavit in
Support of Respondent's motion included the comment that
"petitioner must proceed in the proper venue ... "
but neither
(continued ... )
15

venue been made. 10
As a technical matter, therefore, the question of improper
venue is not before me.

However, as a practical matter, this issue

was

oral

raised

during

the

arguments held

before me,

and,

I

believe, is properly disposed of here.
At

best,

were

there

an

actual

motion

before

me,

the

determination as to whether venue should be removed from New York
county would be discretionary because of the failure to serve a
§511 demand.

I exercise my discretion to deny any change of venue

for the following reasons:
1.

This

court

has

had

jurisdict~on

over

petitioner's

problems with the Parole Board since at least 1993.

Respondent

appeared at all times on the Article 78 proceeding challenging

9

( ••• continued)
stated where proper venue lay nor made any demand for change of
venue.
10

It is clear that even if a case or proceeding is
improperly venued, there is no lack of jurisdiction in a Supreme
Court which renders a decision in that case or proceeding.
See,
e.g., McLaughlin Practice Commentaries, see 509:1 7(b) McKinney's
CPLR p 69 (1976) D. Siegel, New York Practice (2nd Ed. 183 1991).
As Professor Siegel states, in an Article 78 proceeding:
A failure to object to proper venue is a
waiver of the objection, citing HVAC and
Sprinkler Contractors Ass'n Inc. v state Univ.
Constr. Fund, 80 Misc 2d 1047 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
co. 1975) the ensuing judgment on the merits
is valid."
Siegel, supra at p 886.
16

petitioner's February, 1992 parole hearing.

No objection to venue

in New York County was ever made, and this court rendered a lengthy
decision, supra, with specific instructions to the Parole Board.
No indication that the case was improperly venued was made at that
time or ae any time thereafter until June of 1994.

Respondent is,

thus, at the very least, guilty of laches.
2.

The interests of conservation of judicial time are served

by retaining venue in New York County.

I am fully familiar with

the facts of this case, having reviewed the Parole Board records in
camera, and having heard a number of oral arguments on the instant
petition,

as well,

of

course,

as

on the prior _petition.

To

transfer this case to another county and another judge would result
in an enormous waste of judicial resources.
..

3.

--

The issue of convenience of the parties also clearly

weighs toward leaving venue in New York county.

The respondent,

although it has its principal office in Albany, has an office in
New York, and has been represented throughout this proceeding by an
Assistant Attorney General located in New York County.
Since June of 1994 the petitioner has been represented by
Lincoln Square Legal Services, Inc., a clinic run in conjunction
with Fordham University School of Law located in New York county.
In its Memorandum in Support of Petition dated April 24, 1995, the
clinic states that

if the proceeding is transferred to Albany
17
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County, it may no longer be able to represent the petitioner, and
even if representation is continued,

the lack of resources for

travel, etc., would make such representation extremely difficult,
if not impossible.
The

clinic has

done

an extraordin~y

job

in representing

petitioner thus far; 11 its fine representation is an aid not only
to its client but also to the court.

The potential deprivation of

counsel which would result from changing venue clearly militates
against such change, and in favor of retention in New York County.

For all of the above reasons I exercise my discretion, to the
extent that the issue is even before me, to retain jurisdiction and
to decide this Article 78 proceeding.
REMEDY

Ordinarily,

the

appropriate

remedy

upon

annulment

of

the

Parole Board's action would be, as in my prior order, to remand for
a rehearing in accordance with the specific provisions, if any, of
the court's order.

On the unique facts of this case, however, a

different remedy is required.
I

begin by noting that the petitioner has met all of the

11

Clinical Professor James Cohen and his students Matthew
Cushing, Milind Parekh, Sarena Straus and Sarah Watson are to be
commended for the quality of their work and the high degree of
professionalism they have demonstrated.

18
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statutory requirements to demonstrate that if released,

he can

"live and remain at liberty without violating the law" Exec. L.
259-i(c) (1) and that his release is compatible with the welfare of
society, Exec. L. 259-i(c) (2).
)

First, as described in my prior opinion, in 1988 petitioner
was released on bail by a federal court which held:
There
is
no
basis
for
finding
that
[petitioner] poses a danger to the public if
released.
Quartararo v Fogg, #86-cv-2337
(E.D.N.Y.)
(unpublished
order,
dated
03/18/88.)
Indeed,

following

his

release

on

bail

pending

a

petitioner distinguished himself as a model citizen.

new

trial,

He worked,

sometimes at two jobs, attended college, met and married his wife
·Patricia.

He became involved in community affairs such as the
·-

loca l Parent Teachers Association, and helped raise and support his
wife's two school-aged children.

He had no conflicts with the law

during this period, and he made all scheduled court appearances.
Second, even after petitioner was returned to prison in 1990,
he continued on a path of positive growth, graduating with honors
from the State University of New York at New Paltz, continuing his
model behavior,

and participating in numerous other programs in

prison.
In October 1991,

after review by no less than six ranking

correctional professionals, petitioner was approved for the DOCS
19
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Temporary Release Program.

Initially, he left an upstate prison on

two

furloughs

unescorted

seven-day

Christmas holidays.
work

release.

the

Thanksgiving

and

In January 1992, petitioner was transferred to
He

administrative

for

immediately

assistant

secured

in 'a manufacturing

employment

as

an

Petitioner

firm.

obeyed all rules and regulations, made all required reports, and
continued his model behavior.
Third, the record contains three psychological reports.

All

portray petitioner as a thoroughly self-managing young man without
mental

illness,

without

thought

disorder,

clear

thinking

and

reality oriented, a~d perhaps most significantly, not suicidal or
homicidal or a danger to himself or others.

And,

finally,

as

discussed at length in my prior decision petitioner's institutional
record is exemplary.
Nor can the third requirement of the "reasonable probability"
standard of Exec. L. 251-i(c), that the defendant's release "will
serve to deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to undermine
respect

for

the

law"

ineligible for parole.

Exec.

The

King

case

259-i(c) (3)

make

petitioner

The seriousness of the crime is not basis

by itself, for denying parole.
Parole, 190 AD2d 423

L.

E.g., Matter of King v Division of

(1st Dept. 1993) aff'd 83 NY2d 788
is

illustrative.

There

the

(1994).

defendant was

convicted of murder, manslaughter in the second degree, attempted
20
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r

r
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(

robbery in the first degree, assault first degree and possession of
a dangerous weapon.

The charges arose out of the shooting death of

an off duty police officer during the robbery of a
restaurant by two men.
the

importance

of

fast

food

Despite the seriousness of the crime, and
impressing

upon

the

public

the

titter

impermissibility of assaulting or, worse, killing a police officer,
the

First

Department

extraordinary

in

King

rehabilitative

noted

that

achievements

the

petitioner's

" ... would

appear

to

strongly militate in favor of granting parole" and found " ... it
difficult to believe that petitioner would be denied parole after
a hearing at which the statutory factors are fair~y and properly
applied."

Id. at 532-34.

As in King, the crime for which petitioner was convicted is a
most serious one.

It is, however, difficult to conclude that this

single event which occurred more than sixteen years ago, when the
petitioner was fourteen years of age, could be the sole basis for
the Parole Board's denial of parole on any of the three statutory
grounds, particularly in light of the events which have transpired
during the decade and a half since the crime occurred.
the Appellate Division in King,

I

Like

find it almost impossible to

believe that a parole hearing in which the statutory factors were
fairly and properly applied could result in anything other than the
petitioner's release on parole, yet this is what has happened not
21
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happened not once, but on three separate occasions.
I

Accordingly,

find that the only appropriate relief left to this court is a

direction to the respondent to release the petitioner to parole
supervision.
Respondent h'as demonstrated the petitioner will never receive
a fair parole hearing.
shown that

On three separate occasions respondent has

it cannot or will not

follow

its

own regulations,

statutory mandate, or the lawful order of this court.

Each of

petitioner's hearings has been tainted by improper and prejudicial
information, including that which I specifically ordered respondent
not to consider.

The Board has

failed to support any of its

determinations by adequate evidence,

has misconstrued its role,

power and duty, prejudged each of petitioner's parole applications,
and applied the wrong legal standard.

For all of these reasons,

and because it is difficult if not impossible to believe that each
of

the

nineteen

State

Parole

Commissioners has

not

formed

an

opinion or been tainted in some way by the improprieties in this
case, the only appropriate relief is an order directing release.
CPLR §7806 provides that in a proceeding to review an agency
determination,

"the judgment may grant petitioner the relief to

which he is entitled ... and may direct or prohibit specified action
by the respondent. 11
bi::-oad,

and

include

The court's remedial powers under 7806 are
the

power to
22

direct

respondent to

release
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In at least one other remarkably similar

petitioner on parole.

case, the court ordered a parole applicant released on parole after
several

hearings

at

which the Board

refused to adhere to

ignored court orders

and

People ex rel

appellate court rulings.

Schaurer v Smith, 81 Misc 2d 1039 (Sup. Ct. Wyo.'lco. 1975) . 12

The

court imposed this drastic remedy on the basis of its finding that
"it is absolutely useless to send this inmate back [to the Board]
for

a

new hearing"

id.

at

p

1043.

It would

similarly

be

"useless" 13 to remand this case for a fourth hearing.
CONCLUSION

For

all

of

the

above

reasons,

the

Parole

Board's

determinations of February and March 1994 are annulled, and the
Board is directed to release petitioner to parole supervision.
This constitutes the decision and judgment of the court.

DATED: AUGUST

0

~

1995

Kristi~Booth Glen

12

13

Ordering yet another de novo hearing, which respondent
suggests is the only available remedy, would result in petitioner
being placed on an absurd procedural merry go round in which
respondent would be free to make the same irrational and
unsupported determination while the court stands powerless to do
anything except send the case around for another "spin."
This
scenario would not only result in a complete waste of judicial and
__ administrative resources, but, more seriou!:5_lY_; a total deprivation
of petitioner's right to a fair hearing which, if provided w6µld
surely result in his release.

F1LE
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